

Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 ERDA-05 CIAE-00 EUR-12 H-02 INR-07 IO-10 L-03

NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-04 PRS-01 SAJ-01

SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15 TRSE-00 DODE-00 NSC-05 ISO-00

NSCE-00 SSO-00 USIE-00 INRE-00 ACDE-00 /083 W

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FM USMISSION NATO

TO SECSTATE IMMEDIATE 4617

SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

INFO USDEL MBFR VIENNA

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USNMR SHAEPE

USCINCEUR

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 USNATO 6221

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO, MBFR

SUBJECT: MBFR: AD HOC GROUP BRIEFING OF THE COUNCIL
NOVEMBER 14

REFS: A) MBFR VIENNA 533 DTG 121900Z NOV 75;

B) STATE 270063 DTG 140155Z NOV 75

SUMMARY: AT NOVEMBER 14 AHG BRIEFING OF THE COUNCIL, THE DISCUSSION CONCENTRATED ON THE STATE OF ALLIANCE WORK ON OPTION III. SYG LUNS EMPHASIZED THAT WHETHER THE NAC APPROVED GUIDANCE ON OPTION III IN THE PRESENT NEGOTIATING ROUND WOULD DEPEND ON WHETHER INSTRUCTIONS FROM CAPITALS PERMITTED SUCH APPROVAL. IN RESPONSE TO REMARKS ON RELEVANCE OF OPTION III TO SALT, STREATOR (US) DREW FULLY ON INSTRUCTIONS, INCLUDING THE POINT THAT THE SPC SHOULD STRIVE TO COMPLETE WORK ON OPTION III WITHIN THE NEXT COUPLE OF WEEKS, SO THE NAC WOULD HAVE THE OPTION OF TABLING IT DURING THE CURRENT SECRET

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ROUND. UK VIENNA REP ROSE AND UK DCM LOGAN LATER CALLED ON STREATOR AND STATED THEIR VIEW THAT THE ALLIES WOULD NOT MAKE THE NECESSARY COMPROMISES IN THE NEXT COUPLE OF WEEKS, UNLESS THE ALLIES WERE WORKING AGAINST A FIRM TARGET DATE

FOR USE OF OPTION III WITH THE EAST. ON THE QUESTION OF WHEN
OPTION III SHOULD BE USED WITH THE EAST, THEY WERE AWARE
OF NO FIXED UK VIEWS. END SUMMARY.

1. NAC ON NOVEMBER 14 RECEIVED REGULAR BRIEFING FROM AHG ON
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE NEGOTIATION WITH THE EAST. GRANDE
(CANADA) WAS PRINCIPAL AHG SPOKESMAN, AND WAS ASSISTED BY
ROSE (UK) AND BRYNTESEN (NORWAY). IN HIS INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT,
GRANDE ADHERED CLOSELY TO THE TEXT IN REF A.

2. SYG LUNS NOTED THAT GRANDE'S STATEMENT RAISED THE QUESTION
OF WHETHER THE AHG WOULD RECEIVE NAC GUIDANCE ON OPTION III
BEFORE THE END OF THIS NEGOTIATING ROUND. LUNS SAID THAT
WHETHER THIS WILL HAPPEN WILL DEPEND ON WHETHER INSTRUCTIONS
FROM CAPITALS PERMIT IT. UNLESS ALL GOVERNMENTS DECIDE
POSITIVELY ON THE NEED TO INTRODUCE OPTION III THIS NEGOTIATING
ROUND, AND INSTRUCT THEIR DELEGATIONS ACCORDINGLY, IT DOES
NOT SEEM LIKELY THAT THE AHG WILL RECEIVE GUIDANCE FOR ACTION
THIS NEGOTIATING ROUND.

3. DE STAERCKE (BELGIUM) AGREED THAT WHETHER THE NAC CAN
APPROVE GUIDANCE ON OPTION III THIS NEGOTIATING ROUND
DEPENDS ON GOVERNMENTS. BELGIUM, FOR ITS PART, DID NOT WANT
TO SEND GUIDANCE TO VIENNA WHICH WAS AMBIGUOUS ON "HARD CORE"
PROBLEMS. ONE SUCH PROBLEM IS THE NEED TO SEEK AGREEMENT
WITH THE EAST IN PHASE I ON THE LEVEL OF THE COMMON CEILING.

4. HARTOGH (NETHERLANDS) SAID HE AGREED WITH DE STAERCKE ON
THE COMMON CEILING. IT WAS IMPORTANT NOT TO GIVE THE OTHER
SIDE THE IMPRESSION THAT THE COMMON CEILING IS NOT AN IMPORTANT
ALLIED OBJECTIVE. HE REGRETTED THAT NO PROGRESS HAD BEEN
POSSIBLE ON THIS ISSUE. HE HAD THE IMPRESSION THE ALLIES
WERE STILL WHERE THEY WERE ON THIS ISSUE SOME TIME AGO. IN
PARTICULAR, THE US POSITION HAD NOT CHANGED MUCH.

5. LUNS NOTED THAT THE US WAS IN THE PROCESS OF ADJUSTMENT
TO CHANGES IN HIGH-LEVEL PERSONNEL. IN ADDITION, IT WAS
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CLEAR THAT THERE WAS NO PROGRESS IN THE SALT NEGOTIATIONS.

6. KILLICK (UK) SAID THAT THE UK BELIEVES THAT IT IS IMPOR-
TANT TO GET THE DETAILS IN THE OPTION III GUIDANCE SETTLED
TO THE FULL SATISFACTION OF THE ALLIES. IT WOULD BE A
MISTAKE JUST TO PATCH UP DIFFERENCES WHICH COULD LATER
EMERGE IN VIENNA. THERE WAS NO TIME PRESSURE. HE AGREED WITH
LUNS THAT SALT AND OTHER EVENTS HAVE RELEVANCE TO THE ALLIED
WORK ON OPTION III. HE ALSO NOTED THAT THE ALLIES WOULD
HAVE TO DECIDE HOW TO HANDLE OPTION III AT THE MINISTERIAL
AND IN THE MINISTERIAL COMMUNIQUE.

7. STREATOR NOTED, WITH RESPECT TO LUNS' REMARK ON

SHIFTS IN HIGH-LEVEL US PERSONNEL, THAT SECRETARY-DESIGNATE RUMSFELD HAD STRESSED CONTINUITY IN HIS CONFIRMATION HEARINGS AS REFLECTED IN THE WIRELESS FILE. RE THE RELATIONSHIP OF SALT TO OPTION III, HE DREW FULLY ON PARA 2, REF B. IN RESPONSE TO THE REMARKS OF DE STAERCKE AND HARTOGH ON THE COMMON CEILING, HE SAID THAT THE SPC HAD MADE PROGRESS ON THIS ISSUE. THE US HAS MOVED A GREAT DISTANCE FROM ITS INITIAL POSITION. HE POINTED OUT THAT THE US MADE A COMPROMISE PROPOSAL, AND ACCEPTED CERTAIN UK AMENDMENTS. THE RESULT IS LANGUAGE PROVIDING THAT THE AHG SHOULD SEEK AN UNDERSTANDING IN PHASE I ON THE NUMERICAL LEVEL OF THE COMMON CEILING, AFTER THE COUNCIL HAS DECIDED ON THAT LEVEL. A DECISION ON THAT LEVEL CANNOT, OF COURSE, BE TAKEN UNTIL THERE IS FURTHER PROGRESS IN DISCUSSIONS WITH THE EAST ON DATA AND DEFINITION OF FORCES. THIS COMPROMISE IS NOW SUPPORTED BY SEVERAL COUNTRIES, AND WE HOPE THAT BELGIUM AND THE NETHERLANDS WILL BE ABLE TO JOIN THE CONSENSUS AS WELL.

8. LUNS ASKED THE AHG REPS WHAT WOULD BE THE REACTION IN VIENNA IF OPTION III WERE NOT TABLED THIS NEGOTIATING ROUND. GRANDE REPLIED THAT THIS WOULD NOT BE A COMPLETE LOSS, AND OPTION III WOULD STILL CARRY A CERTAIN DEGREE OF ATTRACTION IF PRESENTED LATER. HOWEVER, THE OTHER SIDE WOULD THEN BE ABLE TO EMPHASIZE TO THE PUBLIC THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO ALLIED MOVEMENT DESPITE INDICATIONS THAT THERE MIGHT BE A NEW ALLIED MOVE. THERE WOULD BE SOME ADVANTAGE IN MAKING THE OFFER THIS NEGOTIATING ROUND, PERHAPS THE LAST
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WEEKS, TO GIVE THE OTHER SIDE A CHANCE TO ASK QUESTIONS AND THEN STUDY THE PROPOSAL DURING THE RECESS.

9. ROSE AGREED WITH GRANDE THAT IT WOULD NOT BE A DISASTER IF THE OFFER IS NOT MADE THIS NEGOTIATING ROUND. THERE IS A NEED FOR CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS GUIDANCE. ON THE OTHER HAND, IF THE OFFER IS NOT MADE BY THE END OF THE ROUND, THERE WILL BE ADVERSE PUBLICITY, BUT THE ALLIES ARE USED TO HANDLING PUBLIC REMARKS MADE BY THE EAST. IF THE OFFER IS NOT MADE FOR A LONG TIME, THERE IS ALSO THE POSSIBILITY OF ANOTHER EASTERN INITIATIVE, PERHAPS A MODIFICATION OF THEIR FIRST STEP OR FREEZE PROPOSAL. THIS WOULD ENABLE THE EAST TO SAY THE ALLIES HAD DONE NOTHING, WHILE THE EAST HAD MADE A NEW INITIATIVE; THIS COULD HURT IF THE EAST MOUNTED A PUBLICITY CAMPAIGN. BRYNTESEN AGREED ON THE NEED FOR UNAMBIGUOUS GUIDANCE, AS WELL AS THE RISK OF A NEW EASTERN INITIATIVE.

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INFO USDEL MBFR VIENNA

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10. MENZIES (CANADA) ASKED IF THE ALLIES WOULD NOT BE AT A DISADVANTAGE IF THE OFFER WERE NOT MADE BEFORE THE 25TH CONGRESS OF THE SOVIET COMMUNIST PARTY IN FEBRUARY. BREZHNEV WILL WANT TO SAY SOMETHING AT THAT TIME ABOUT MILITARY DETENTE, AND WE RISK SOME COOKED-UP MBFR INITIATIVE ON THE EASTERN PART. RE THE POSSIBILITY OF ALLIANCE APPROVAL IN TIME FOR USE THIS NEGOTIATING ROUND, HE SUGGESTED THAT THE NAC RETURN TO THE MATTER ON NOVEMBER 26. SVART (DENMARK) DID NOT THINK THE ALLIES SHOULD PAY UNDUE ATTENTION TO THE 25TH PARTY CONGRESS IN ALLIED DELIBERATIONS ON OPTION III. KILICK AGREED WITH SVART. HE SAID MBFR HAD NEVER BEEN A MAJOR PLANK IN BREZHNEV'S DETENTE POLICY.

11. KRAPF (FRG) THOUGHT THAT THE ALLIES MIGHT FIND THEMSELVES CLOSE TO AGREEMENT ON OPTION III AT THE TIME OF THE MINISTERIAL, WITH A FEW ISSUES REMAINING WHICH MIGHT BE DISCUSSED BY MINISTERS. THERE MIGHT BE A NEED FOR DEFENSE MINISTERS ALSO TO BE PRESENT TO ENABLE RAPID DECISIONS TO BE TAKEN. HE ALSO ASKED IF DECEMBER 18 WAS A FIRM OUTER LIMIT FOR THE END OF THE PRESENT NEGOTIATING ROUND, AND GRANDE REPLIED THAT THERE WAS NOTHING HIDEBOUND ABOUT THE TERMINAL DATES.

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12. HARTOGH SAID THAT IF THE MAKING OF THE OFFER IN VIENNA WERE DELAYED, THE EAST WOULD UNDERSTAND THAT THERE WAS A DIFFERENCE OF VIEWS AMONG THE ALLIES, AND THIS WOULD NOT

STRENGTHEN THE ALLIED POSITION. HE DID NOT BELIEVE THE REMAINING PROBLEMS IN THE SPC WERE SO GREAT. HE SAID HE CONSIDERED STREATOR'S REMARKS ON THE COMMON CEILING A STEP FORWARD, AND PERHAPS THERE WAS A MISUNDERSTANDING OF POSITIONS AMONG THE ALLIES.

13. THE NAC AGREED THAT THE NEXT AHG BRIEFING WOULD BE DECEMBER 5, AND THAT THE AHG SHOULD SUBMIT A REPORT FOR THE MINISTERIAL, BUT NOT AN END-OF-ROUND REPORT. LUNS SUMMED UP THAT ALL AGREED THAT THE SPC SHOULD SEE WHAT FURTHER PROGRESS COULD BE MADE, AND THEN REPORT BACK TO THE NAC.

14. ROSE AND UK DCM (LOGAN) LATER CALLED ON STREATOR TO DISCUSS THE US VIEW STATED IN PARA 2, REF B. THEY NOTED THAT THE US WISHED THE ALLIANCE TO HAVE THE OPTION OF TABLING OPTION III IN THE CURRENT NEGOTIATING ROUND, BUT HAD NOT SAID THAT THE US WISHED TO TABLE THIS NEGOTIATING ROUND. IN THEIR VIEW, THE ALLIES WOULD NOT MAKE THE NECESSARY COMPROMISES IN THE NEXT COUPLE OF WEEKS TO PRODUCE AGREEMENT ON OPTION III, UNLESS THERE WERE A FIRM DEADLINE FOR USE OF OPTION III WITH THE EAST. IF THE ALLIES DID MAKE SUCH COMPROMISES, AND OPTION III WERE APPROVED, AND THEN PUT ON THE SHELF FOR A COUPLE OF MONTHS, CIRCUMSTANCES WOULD CHANGE, AND VARIOUS ALLIES WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY RE-OPEN SOME OF THE ISSUES. ROSE AND LOGAN SAID THAT UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES THEY COULD NOT SEE WHY THE UK WOULD MAKE MAJOR COMPROMISES IN THE NEXT COUPLE OF WEEKS. ON THE QUESTION OF WHEN OPTION III SHOULD BE PLAYED WITH THE EAST, THEY WERE NOT AWARE OF ANY FIXED UK VIEWS. IN THE DISCUSSION WITH ROSE AND LOGAN, STREATOR EMPHASIZED THE USEFULNESS OF HAVING OPTION III READY FOR USE AT THE PROPER TIME. BRUCE

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